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ABSTRACT
In cloud computing, network Denial of Service (DoS) at-
tacks are well studied and defenses have been implemented,
but severe DoS attacks on a victim’s working memory by
a single hostile VM are not well understood. Memory DoS
attacks are Denial of Service (or Degradation of Service) at-
tacks caused by contention for hardware memory resources
on a cloud server. Despite the strong memory isolation tech-
niques for virtual machines (VMs) enforced by the software
virtualization layer in cloud servers, the underlying hard-
ware memory layers are still shared by the VMs and can be
exploited by a clever attacker in a hostile VM co-located on
the same server as the victim VM, denying the victim the
working memory he needs. We first show quantitatively the
severity of contention on different memory resources. We
then show that a malicious cloud customer can mount low-
cost attacks to cause severe performance degradation for a
Hadoop distributed application, and 38× delay in response
time for an E-commerce website in the Amazon EC2 cloud.
Then, we design an effective, new defense against these
memory DoS attacks, using a statistical metric to detect
their existence and execution throttling to mitigate the at-
tack damage. We achieve this by a novel re-purposing of
existing hardware performance counters and duty cycle mod-
ulation for security, rather than for improving performance
or power consumption. We implement a full prototype on
the OpenStack cloud system. Our evaluations show that this
defense system can effectively defeat memory DoS attacks
with negligible performance overhead.
1. INTRODUCTION
Public Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) clouds provide
elastic computing resources on demand to customers at low
cost. Anyone with a credit card may host scalable applica-
tions in these computing environments, and become a ten-
ant of the cloud. To maximize resource utilization, cloud
providers schedule virtual machines (VMs) leased by differ-
ent tenants on the same physical machine, sharing the same
hardware resources.
While software isolation techniques, like VM virtualiza-
tion, carefully isolate memory pages (virtual and physical),
most of the underlying hardware memory hierarchy is still
shared by all VMs running on the same physical machine
in a multi-tenant cloud environment. Malicious VMs can
exploit the multi-tenancy feature to intentionally cause se-
vere contention on the shared memory resources to conduct
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks against other VMs sharing
the resources. Moreover, it has been shown that a malicious
cloud customer can intentionally co-locate his VMs with vic-
tim VMs to run on the same physical machine [36, 39, 46];
this co-location attack can serve as a first step for performing
memory DoS attacks against an arbitrary target.
The severity of memory resource contention has been se-
riously underestimated. While it is temping to presume the
level of interference caused by resource contention is mod-
est, and in the worst case, the resulting performance degra-
dation is isolated on one compute node, we show this is not
the case. We present advanced attack techniques that, when
exploited by malicious VMs, can induce much more intense
memory contention than normal applications could do, and
can degrade the performance of VMs on multiple nodes.
To demonstrate that our attacks work on real applications
in real-world settings, we applied them to two case stud-
ies conducted in a commercial IaaS cloud, Amazon Elastic
Compute Cloud (EC2). We show that even if the attacker
only has one VM co-located with one of the many VMs of
the target multi-node application, significant performance
degradation can be caused to the entire application, rather
than just to a single node. In our first case study, we show
that when the adversary co-locates one VM with one node of
a 20-node distributed Hadoop application, he may cause up
to 3.7× slowdown of the entire distributed application. Our
second case study shows that our attacks can slow down the
response latency of an E-commerce application (consisting
of load balancers, web servers, database servers and memory
caching servers) by up to 38 times, and reduce the through-
put of the servers down to 13%.
Despite the severity of the attacks, neither current cloud
providers nor research literature offer any solutions to mem-
ory DoS attacks. Our communication with cloud providers
suggests such issues are not currently addressed, in part be-
cause the attack techniques presented in this paper are non-
conventional, and existing solutions to network-based DDoS
attacks do not help. Research studies have not explored de-
fenses against adversarial memory contention either. As will
be discussed in Sec. 6.2, existing solutions [13, 19, 47, 53, 55]
only aim to enhance performance isolation between benign
applications. Intentional memory abuses that are evident in
memory DoS attacks are immune to these solutions.
Therefore, a large portion of this paper is devoted to
the design and implementation of a novel and effective ap-
proach to detect and mitigate all known types of memory
DoS attacks with low-cost overhead. Our detection strat-
egy provides a generalized method for detecting deviations
from the baseline behavior of the victim VM due to memory
DoS attacks. We collect the baseline behaviors of the mon-
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itored VM at runtime, by creating a pseudo isolated period,
without completely pausing co-tenant VMs. This provides
periodic (re)establishment of baseline behaviors that adapt
to changes in program phases and workload characteristics.
Once memory DoS attacks are detected, we show how ma-
licious VMs can be identified and their attacks mitigated,
using a novel form of selective execution throttling.
We implemented a prototype of our defense solution on
the opensource OpenStack cloud software, and extensively
evaluated its effectiveness and efficiency. Our evaluation
shows that we can accurately detect memory DoS attacks
and promptly and effectively mitigate the attacks. The per-
formance overhead of persistent performance monitoring is
lower than 5%, which is low enough to be used in produc-
tion public clouds. Because our solution does not require
modifications of CPU hardware, hypervisor or guest oper-
ating systems, it minimally impacts the existing cloud im-
plementations. Therefore, we envision our solution can be
rapidly deployed in public clouds as a new security service
to customers who require higher security assurances (like in
Security-on-Demand clouds [24,48]).
In summary, the contributions of this paper are:
• A set of attack techniques to perform memory DoS at-
tacks. Measurement of the severity of the resulting Degra-
dation of Service (DoS) to the victim VM.
• Demonstration of the severity of memory DoS attacks
in public clouds (Amazon EC2) against Hadoop applica-
tions and E-commerce websites.
• A novel, generalizable, attack detection method to detect
abnormal probability distribution deviations at runtime,
that adapts to program phase changes and different work-
load inputs.
• A novel method for detecting the attack VM using selec-
tive execution throttling.
• A new, rapidly deployable, defense for all memory DoS
attacks with accurate detection and low-overhead, using
existing hardware processor features.
We first discuss our threat model and background of mem-
ory resources in Sec. 2. Techniques to perform memory DoS
attacks are presented in Sec. 3. We show the power of these
attacks in two case studies conducted in Amazon EC2 in
Sec. 4. Our new defense techniques are described and eval-
uated in Sec. 5. We summarize related work in Sec. 6 and
conclude in Sec. 7.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Threat Model and Assumptions
We consider security threats from malicious tenants of
public IaaS clouds. We assume the adversary has the ability
to launch at least one VM on the cloud servers on which the
victim VMs are running. Techniques required to do so have
been studied [36, 39, 46], and are orthogonal to our work.
The adversary can run any program inside his own VM. We
do not assume that the adversary can send network packets
to the victim directly, thus resource freeing attacks [38] or
network-based DoS attacks [28] are not applicable. We do
not consider attacks from the cloud providers, or any attacks
requiring direct control of privileged software.
We assume the software and hardware isolation mecha-
nisms function correctly as designed. A hypervisor virtual-
izes and manages the hardware resources (see Figure 1) so
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Figure 1: An attacker VM (with 2 vCPUs) and a victim VM
share multiple layers of memory resources.
that each VM thinks it has the entire computer. A server
can have multiple processor packages, where all processor
cores in a package share a Last Level Cache (LLC), while
L1 and L2 caches are private to a processor core and not
shared by different cores. All processor packages share the
Integrated Memory Controller (IMC), the inter-package bus
and the main memory storage (DRAM chips). Each VM is
designated a disjoint set of virtual CPUs (vCPU), which can
be scheduled to operate on any physical cores based on the
hypervisor’s scheduling algorithms. A program running on
a vCPU may use all the hardware resources available to the
physical core it runs on. Hence, different VMs may simul-
taneously share the same hardware caches, buses, memory
channels and DRAM bank buffers. We assume the cloud
provider may schedule VMs from different customers on the
same server (as co-tenants), but likely on different physical
cores. As is the case today, software-based VM isolation by
the hypervisor only isolates accesses to virtual and physical
memory pages, but not to the underlying hardware memory
resources shared by the physical cores.
2.2 Hardware Memory Resources
Figure 2 shows the hardware memory resources in mod-
ern computers. Using Intel processors as examples, mod-
ern X86-64 processors usually consist of multiple processor
packages, each of which consists of several physical pro-
cessor cores. Each physical core can execute one or two
hardware threads in parallel with the support of Hyper-
Threading Technology. A hierarchical memory subsystem,
from the top to the bottom, is composed of different lev-
els of storage-based components (e.g., caches, the DRAMs).
These memory components are inter-connected by a vari-
ety of scheduling-based components (e.g., memory buses and
controllers), with various schedulers arbitrating their com-
munications. Memory resources shared by different cores
are described below:
Last Level Caches (LLC). An LLC is shared by all cores
in one package (older processors may have one package sup-
ported by multiple LLCs). Intel LLCs usually adopt an
inclusive cache policy: every cache line maintained in the
upper-level caches (i.e., core-private Level 1 and Level 2
caches in each core - not shown in Figure 2) also has a copy
in the LLC. In other words, when a cache line in the LLC is
evicted, so are the copies in the upper-level caches. A subse-
quent access to the memory block mapped to this cache line
will result in an LLC miss, which will lead to the much slower
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Figure 2: Shared storage-based and scheduling-based hardware memory resources in multi-core cloud servers.
main memory access. On recent Intel processors (since Ne-
halem), LLCs are split into multiple slices, each of which is
associated with one physical core, although every core may
use the entire LLC. Intel employs static hash mapping al-
gorithms to translate the physical address of a cache line to
one of the LLC slices that contains the cache line. These
mappings are unique for each processor model and are not
released to the public. So it is harder for attackers to gen-
erate LLC contention using the method from [43].
Memory Buses. Intel uses a ring bus topology to inter-
connect components in the processor package, e.g., processor
cores, LLC slices, Integrated Memory Controllers (IMCs),
QuickPath Interconnect (QPI) agents, etc. The high-speed
QPI provides point-to-point interconnections between dif-
ferent processor packages, and between each processor pack-
age and I/O devices. The memory controller bus connects
the LLC slices to the bank schedulers in the IMC, and the
DRAM bus connects the IMC’s schedulers to the DRAM
banks. Current memory bus designs with high bandwidth
make it very difficult for attackers to saturate the memory
buses. Also, elimination of bus locking operations for nor-
mal atomic operations make bus locking attacks via normal
atomic operations (e.g., [43]) less effective. However, some
exotic atomic bus locking operations still exist.
DRAM banks. Each DRAM package consists of several
banks, each of which can be thought of as a two dimensional
data array with multiple rows and columns. Each bank has
a bank buffer to hold the most recently used row to speed up
DRAM accesses. A memory access to a DRAM bank may
either be served in the bank buffer, which is a buffer-hit
(fast), or in the bank itself, which is a buffer-miss (slow).
Integrated Memory Controllers (IMC). Each proces-
sor package contains one or multiple IMCs. The communica-
tions between an IMC and the portion of DRAM it controls
are supported by multiple memory channels, each of which
serves a set of DRAM banks. When the processor wants to
access the data in the DRAM, it first calculates the bank
that stores the data based on the physical address, then
it sends the memory request to the IMC that controls the
bank. The processor can request data from the IMC in the
local package, as well as in a different package via QPI. The
IMCs implement a bank priority queue for each bank they
serve, to buffer the memory requests to this bank. A bank
scheduler is used to schedule requests in the bank priority
queue, typically using a First-Ready-First-Come-First-Serve
algorithm that gives high scheduling priority to the request
that leads to a buffer-hit in the DRAM bank buffer, and then
to the request that arrived earliest. Once requests are sched-
uled by the bank scheduler, a channel scheduler will further
schedule them, among requests from other bank schedulers,
to multiplex the requests onto a shared memory channel.
The channel scheduler usually adopts a First-Come-First-
Serve algorithm, which favors the earlier requests. Modern
DRAM and IMCs can handle a large amount of requests
concurrently, so the it is less effective to flood the DRAM
and IMCs to generate severe contention, as shown in [32].
3. MEMORY DOS ATTACKS
3.1 Fundamental Attack Strategies
We have classified all memory resources into either storage-
based or scheduling-based resources. This helps us formulate
the following two fundamental attack strategies for memory
DoS attacks:
• Storage-based contention attack. The fundamental
attack strategy to cause contention on storage-based re-
sources is to reduce the probability that the victim’s data
is found in an upper-level memory resource (faster), thus
forcing it to fetch the data from a lower-level resource
(slower).
• Scheduling-based contention attack. The funda-
mental attack strategy on a scheduling-based resource is
to decrease the probability that the victim’s requests are
selected by the scheduler, e.g., by locking the scheduling-
based resources temporarily, tricking the scheduler to im-
prove the priority of the attacker’s requests, or overwhelm-
ing the scheduler by submitting a huge amount of requests
simultaneously.
We systematically show how memory DoS attacks can be
constructed on different layers of memory resources (LLC in
Sec. 3.2, bus in Sec. 3.3, memory controller and DRAM in
Sec. 3.4). For each memory component, we first study the
basic techniques the attacker can use to generate resource
contention and affect the victim’s performance. We mea-
sure the effectiveness of the attack techniques on the victim
VM with different vCPU locations and program features.
Then we propose some practical attacks and evaluate their
impacts on real-world benchmarks.
Testbed configuration. To demonstrate the severity of
different types of memory DoS attacks, we use a server con-
figuration, representative of many cloud servers, configured
as shown in Table 1. We use Intel processors, since they are
the most common in cloud servers, but the attack methods
we propose are general, and applicable to other processors
and platforms as well.
Table 1: Testbed Configuration
Server Dell PowerEdge R720
Processor Packages Two 2.9GHz Intel Xeon E5-2667 (Sandy Bridge)
Cores per Package 6 physical cores, or 12 hardware threads with Hyper-Threading
Core-private L1 I and L1 D: each 32KB, 8-way set-associative;
Level 1 and Level 2 caches L2 cache: 256KB, 8-way set-associative
Last Level Cache (LLC) 15MB, 20-way set-associative, shared by cores in package, divided
into 6 slices of 2.5MB each; one slice per core
Physical memory Eight 8GB DRAMs, divided into 8 channels, and 1024 banks
Hypervisor Xen version 4.1.0
VM’s OS Ubuntu 12.04 Linux, with 3.13 kernel
In each of the following experiments, we launched two
VMs, one as the attacker and the other as the victim. By
default, each VM was assigned a single vCPU. We select a
mix set of benchmarks for the victim: (1) We use a modi-
fied stream program [31,32] as a micro benchmark to explore
the effectiveness of the attacks on victims with different fea-
tures. This program allocates two array buffers with the
same size, one as the source and the other as the destina-
tion. It copies data from the source to the destination in
loops repeatedly, either in a sequential manner (resulting a
program with high memory locality) or in a random manner
(low memory locality). We chose this benchmark because it
is memory-intensive and allows us to alter the size of mem-
ory footprints and the locality of memory resources. (2) To
fully evaluate the attack effects on real-world applications,
we choose 8 macro benchmarks (6 from SPEC2006 [10] and
2 from PARSEC [16]) and cryptographic applications based
on OpenSSL as the victim program. Each experiment was
repeated 10 times, and the mean values and standard devi-
ations are reported.
3.2 Cache Contention (Storage Resources)
Of the storage-based contention attacks, we found that
the LLC contention results in the most severe performance
degradation. The root vulnerability is that an LLC is shared
by all cores of the same CPU package, without access con-
trol or quota enforcement. Therefore a program in one VM
can evict LLC cache lines belonging to another VM. More-
over, inclusive LLCs (e.g., most modern Intel LLCs) will
propagate these cache line evictions to core-private L1 and
L2 caches, further aggravating the interference between pro-
grams (or VMs) in CPU caches.
3.2.1 Contention Study
Cache cleansing. To cause LLC contention, the adver-
sary can allocate a memory buffer to cover the entire LLC.
By accessing one memory address per memory block in the
buffer, the adversary can cleanse the entire cache and evict
all of the victim’s data from the LLC to the DRAM.
The optimal buffer used by the attacker should exactly
map to the LLC, which means it can fill up each cache set
in each LLC slice without self-conflicts (i.e., evicting earlier
lines loaded from this buffer). For example, for a LLC with
ns slices, nc sets in each slice, and nw-way set-associativity,
the attacker would like ns×nc×nw memory blocks to cover
all cache lines of all sets in all slices. There are two chal-
lenges that make this task difficult for the attacker: the host
physical addresses of the buffer to index the cache slice are
unknown to the attacker, and the mapping from physical
memory addresses to LLC slices is not publicly known.
Mapping LLC cache slices: To overcome these challenges,
the attacker can first allocate a 1GB Hugepage which is guar-
anteed to have continuous host physical addresses; thus he
need not worry about virtual to physical page translations
which he does not know. Then for each LLC cache set Si in
all slices, the attacker sets up an empty group Gi, and starts
the following loop: (i) select block Ak from the Hugepage,
which is mapped to set Si by the same index bits in the
memory address; (ii) add Ak to Gi; (iii) access all the blocks
in Gi; and (iv) measure the average access latency per block.
A longer latency indicates block Ak causes self-conflict with
other blocks in Gi, so it is removed from Gi. The above loop
is repeated until there are ns × nw blocks in Gi, which can
exactly fill up set Si in all slices. Next the attacker needs to
distinguish which blocks in Gi belong to each slice: He first
selects a new block An mapped to set Si from the Hugepage,
and adds it to Gi. This should cause a self-conflict. Then
he executes the following loop: (i) select one block Am from
Gi; (ii) remove it from Gi; (iii) access all the blocks in Gi;
and (iv) measure the average access latency. A short latency
indicates block Am can eliminate the self-conflict caused by
An, so it belongs to the same slice as An. The attacker keeps
doing this until he discovers nw blocks that belong to the
same slice as An. These blocks form the group that can fill
up set Si in one slice. The above procedure is repeated till
the blocks in Gi are divided into ns slices for set Si. After
conducting the above process for each cache set, the attacker
obtains a memory buffer with non-consecutive blocks that
map exactly to the LLC. Such self-conflict elimination is also
useful in improving side-channel attacks [27].
To test the effectiveness of cache cleansing, we arranged
the attacker VM and victim VM on the same processor pack-
age, thus sharing the LLC and all memory resources in lower
layers. The adversary first identified the memory buffer that
maps to the LLC. Then he cleansed the whole LLC repeat-
edly. The resulting performance degradation of the victim
application is shown in Figure 3. The victim suffered from
the most significant performance degradation when the vic-
tim’s buffer size is around 10MB (1.8× slowdown for the
high locality program, and 5.5× slowdown for the low lo-
cality program). When the buffer size is smaller than 5MB
(data are stored mainly in upper-level caches), or the size is
larger than 25MB (data are stored mainly in the DRAM),
the impact of cache contention on LLC is negligible.
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Figure 3: Performance slowdown due to LLC cleansing con-
tention. We use“H-x”or“L-x”to denote the victim program
has high or low memory locality and has a buffer size of x.
The results can be explained as follows: the maximum
performance degradation can be achieved on victims with
memory footprint smaller than, but close to, the LLC size,
which is 15MB, because the victim suffers the least from
self conflicts in LLC and the most from the attacker’s LLC
cleansing. Moreover, as a low locality program accesses its
data in a random order, hardware prefetching is less effective
in enhancing the program’s access speed. So the program
accesses the cache at a relatively lower rate. Its data will be
evicted out of the LLC by the attacker with higher proba-
bility. That is why the LLC cleansing has a larger impact
on low locality programs than on high locality programs.
Takeaways. LLC contention is (more) effective when (1)
the attacker and victim VMs share the same LLC, (2) the
victim program’s memory footprint is about the size of LLC,
and (3) the victim program has lower memory locality.
3.2.2 Practical Attack Evaluation
We improve this attack by increasing the cleansing speed,
and the accuracy of evicting (thus contending with) the vic-
tim’s data.
Multi-threaded LLC cleansing. To speed up the LLC
cleansing, the adversary may split the cleansing task into n
threads, with each running on a separate vCPU and cleans-
ing only a non-overlapping 1/n of the LLC simultaneously.
This effectively increases the cleansing speed by n times.
In our experiment, the attacker VM and the victim VM
were arranged to share the LLC. The attacker VM was as-
signed 4 vCPUs. It first prepared the memory buffer that
exactly mapped to the LLC. Then he cleansed the LLC
with (1) one vCPU; (2) 4 vCPUs (each cleansing 1/4 of the
LLC). Figure 4 shows that the attack can cause 1.05 ∼ 1.6×
slowdown to the victim VM when using one thread, and
1.12 ∼ 2.03× slowdown when using four threads.
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Figure 4: Performance slowdown due to multi-threaded LLC
cleansing attack
Adaptive LLC cleansing. The basic LLC cache cleansing
technique does not work when the victim’s program has a
memory footprint (<1MB) that is much smaller than an
LLC (e.g., 15MB), since it takes a long time to finish one
complete LLC cleansing, where most of the memory accesses
do not induce contention with the victim. To achieve finer-
grained attacks, we developed a cache probing technique to
pinpoint the cache sets in the LLC that map to the victim’s
memory footprint, and cleanse only these selected sets.
The attacker first allocates a memory buffer covering the
entire LLC in his own VM. Then he conducts cache prob-
ing in two steps: (1) In the Discover Stage, while the
Algorithm 1: Adaptive LLC cleansing
Input:
cache set{}: all the sets in the LLC
cache buffer{}: cover the entire LLC
cache assoc num: the associativity of LLC
begin
/* Discover Stage */
victim set=∅
for each set i in cache set{} do
Find out j, s.t., accessing j cache lines in set i from
cache buffer{} has no cache conflict (low accessing
time), but accessing j+1 cache lines in set i from
cache buffer{} has cache conflict (high accessing time)
if j<cache assoc num then
add i to victim set{}
end
end
/* Attack Stage: */
while attack is not finished do
for each set i in victim set{} do
access cache assoc num cache lines in set i from
cache buffer{}
end
end
end
victim program runs, for each cache set, the attacker ac-
cesses some cache lines belonging to this set and figures out
the maximum number of cache lines which can be accessed
without causing cache conflicts. If this number is smaller
than the set associativity, this cache set will be selected to
conduct adaptive cleansing attacks, because the victim has
frequently occupied some cache lines in this set; (2) In the
Attack Stage, the attacker keeps accessing these selected
cache sets to cleanse the victim’s data. Algorithm 1 shows
the steps to perform the adaptive LLC cleansing.
Figure 5 shows the results of the attacker’s multi-threaded
adaptive cleansing attacks against victim applications with
cryptographic operations. While the basic cleansing did not
have any effect, the adaptive attacks can achieve around 1.12
to 1.4 times runtime slowdown with 1 vCPU, and up to 4.4×
slowdown with 4 vCPUs.
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Figure 5: Performance slowdown due to adaptive LLC
cleansing attacks
3.3 Bus Contention (Scheduling Resources)
The availability of internal memory buses can be com-
promised by overwhelming or temporarily locking down the
buses. We study the effects of these techniques.
3.3.1 Contention Study
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(b) Different packages
Figure 6: Performance slowdown due to bus saturation con-
tention. We use“H-xc”or“L-xc” to denote the configuration
that the victim program has high or low locality, and both
of the attacker and victim use x cores to contend for the
bus.
Bus saturation. One intuitive approach for an adversary
is to create numerous memory requests to saturate the buses
[43]. However, the bus bandwidth in modern processors may
be too high for a single VM to saturate.
To examine the effectiveness of bus saturation contention,
we conducted two sets of experiments. In the first set of ex-
periments, the victim VM and the attacker VM were located
in the same processor package but on different physical cores
(Figure 6a). They accessed different parts of the LLC, with-
out touching the DRAM. Therefore the attacker VM causes
contention in the ring bus that connects LLC slices without
causing contention in the LLC itself. In the second set of ex-
periments, the victim VM and the attacker VM were pinned
on different processor packages (Figure 6b). They accessed
different memory channels, without inducing contention in
the memory controller and DRAM modules. Therefore the
attacker and victim VMs only contend in buses that connect
LLCs and IMCs, as well as the QPI buses. The attacker and
victim were assigned increasing number of vCPUs to cause
more bus traffic. Results in Figure 6 show that these buses
were hardly saturated and the impact on the victim’s per-
formance was negligible in all cases.
Bus locking. To deny the victim from being scheduled by
a scheduling resource, the adversary can temporarily lock
down the internal memory buses. Intel processors provide
locked atomic operations for managing shared data struc-
tures between multi-processors [6]. Before Intel Pentium
(P5) processors, the locked atomic operations always gener-
ate LOCK signals on the internal buses to achieve operation
atomicity. So other memory accesses are blocked until the
locked atomic operation is completed. For processor fami-
lies after P6, the bus lock is transformed into a cache lock:
the cache line is locked instead of the bus and the cache
coherency mechanism is used to ensure operation atomicity.
This causes much smaller scheduling lockdown times.
However, we have found two exotic atomic operations the
adversary can still use to lock the internal memory buses:
(1) Locked atomic accesses to unaligned memory blocks: the
processor has to fetch two adjacent cache lines to complete
this unaligned memory access. To guarantee the atomic-
ity of accessing the two adjacent cache lines, the processors
will flush in-flight memory accesses issued before, and block
memory accesses to the bus, until the unaligned memory ac-
cess is finished. (2) Locked atomic accesses to uncacheable
memory blocks: when uncached memory pages are accessed
in atomic operations, the cache coherency mechanism does
not work. Hence, the memory bus must be locked to guar-
antee atomicity. Listings 1 and 2 show the codes for issuing
unaligned and uncached atomic operations. The two pro-
grams keep conducting the addition operation of a constant
(x) and a memory block (block_addr) (line 5 – 11): in line
7, the lock prefix indicates this operation is atomic. The in-
struction xaddl indicates this is an addition operation. The
first operand is the register eax, which stores x (line 9). The
second operand is the first parameter of line 9 (data denoted
by the address block_addr). The results will be loaded to
the register eax (line 8). In Listing 1, we set this memory
block as unaligned (line 4). In Listing 2, we added a new
system call to set the page table entries of the memory buffer
as cache disabled (line 2).
To evaluate the effects of bus locking contention, we chose
the footprint size of the victim program as (1) 8KB, with
which the L1 cache was under-utilized, (2) 64KB, with which
the L1 cache was over-utilized but the L2 cache was under-
utilized, (3) 512KB, with which the L2 cache was over-
utilized but the LLC was under-utilized, and (4) 30MB, with
which the LLC was over-utilized. The attacker VM kept is-
suing unaligned atomic or uncached atomic memory accesses
to lock the memory buses. For comparison, we also run an-
other group of experiments, where the attacker kept issuing
normal locked memory accesses. We considered two scenar-
ios: (1) the attacker and victim shared the same processor
package, but run on different cores; (2) they were scheduled
on different processor packages. The normalized execution
time of the victim program is shown in Figure 7.
We observe that the victim’s performance was significantly
affected when the its buffer size was larger than the L2
caches. This is because the attacker who kept requesting
atomic, unaligned memory accesses was only able to lock
the buses within its physical cores, the ring buses around
the LLCs in each package, the QPI, and the buses from
each package to the DRAM. So when the victim’s buffer
size was smaller than LLC, it fetched data from the private
caches in its own core without being affected by the attacker.
However, when the victim’s buffer size was larger than the
L2 caches, its access to the LLC would be delayed by the
bus locking operations, and the performance is degraded (up
to 6× slowdown for high locality victim programs and 7×
slowdown for low locality victim programs).
Takeaways. We explored two approaches to bus contention.
Saturating internal buses is unlikely to cause noticeable per-
formance degradation. Bus locking shows promise when the
victim program makes heavy use of the shared LLC or lower
layer memory resources, whenever the victim VM and at-
tacker VM are on the same processor package or different
packages.
3.3.2 Practical Attack Evaluation
To evaluate the effectiveness of atomic locking attacks on
real-world applications, we scheduled the attacker VM and
victim VM on different processor packages. The attacker
VM kept generating atomic locking signals by (1) request-
ing unaligned atomic memory accesses, or (2) requesting un-
cached atomic memory accesses. The normalized execution
time of the victim program is shown in Figure 8. We observe
that the victim’s performance can be degraded as much as 7
Listing 1: Attack using unaligned atomic operations
1 char *buffer = mmap(0, BUFFER_SIZE,
PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
2
3 int x = 0x0;
4 int *block_addr = (int *)(buffer+CACHE_LINE_SIZE-1);
5 while (1) {
6 __asm__(
7 "lock; xaddl %%eax, %1\n\t"
8 :"=a"(x)
9 :"m"(*block_addr), "a"(x)
10 :"memory");
11 }
Listing 2: Attack using uncached atomic operations
1 char *buffer = mmap(0, BUFFER_SIZE,
PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
2 syscall(__NR_UnCached, (unsigned long)buffer);
3 int x = 0x0;
4 int *block_addr = (int *)buffer;
5 while (1) {
6 __asm__(
7 "lock; xaddl %%eax, %1\n\t"
8 :"=a"(x)
9 :"m"(*block_addr), "a"(x)
10 :"memory");
11 }
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Figure 7: Performance slowdown due to bus locking contention. We use “H-x” or “L-x” to denote the victim program has high
or low memory locality and has a buffer size of x.
times when the attacker conducted exotic atomic operations.
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Figure 8: Performance slowdown due to bus locking attacks.
3.4 Memory Contention (Combined Resources)
An IMC uses the bank scheduler and channel scheduler to
select the memory requests for each DRAM access. There-
fore an adversary may contend on these two schedulers by
frequently issuing memory requests that result in bank buffer
hits to boost his priority in the scheduler. Moreover, each
memory bank is equipped with only one bank buffer to hold
the recently used bank row, so the adversary can easily in-
duce storage-based contention on bank buffers by frequently
occupying them with his own data.
3.4.1 Contention Study
Memory flooding. Since channel and bank schedulers
use First-Come-First-Serve policies, an attacker can send a
large amount of memory requests to flood the target mem-
ory channels or DRAM banks. These requests will contend
on the scheduling-based resources with the victim’s memory
requests. In addition, the attacker can issue requests in se-
quential order to achieve high row-hit locality and thus high
priority in the bank scheduler, to further increase the effect
of flooding. Furthermore, when the adversary keeps flooding
the IMCs, these memory requests can also evict the victim’s
data out of the DRAM bank buffers. The victim’s bank
buffer hit rate is decreased and its performance is further
degraded.
To demonstrate the effects of DRAM contention, we con-
figure one attacker VM to operate a memory flooding pro-
gram, which kept accessing memory blocks in the same DRAM
bank directly without going through caches (i.e., uncached
accesses). The victim VM did exactly the same with either
high or low memory locality. We conducted two sets of ex-
periments: (1) The two VMs access the same bank in the
same channel (Same bank in Figure 9); (2) the two VMs ac-
cess two different banks in the same channel (Same channel
in Figure 9). To alter the memory request rate issued by
the two VMs, we also changed the number of vCPUs in the
attacker and victim VMs. The normalized execution time
of the victim program is shown in Figure 9.
Three types of contention were observed in these exper-
iments. First, channel scheduling contention was observed
when the attacker and the victim access different banks in
the same channel. It was enhanced with increased number
of attacker and victim vCPUs, thus increasing the memory
request rate (around 1.2× slowdown for “H-5c” and “L-5c”).
Second, bank scheduling contention was also observed when
the attacker and victim accessed the same DRAM bank.
When the memory request rate was increased, the victim’s
performance was further degraded by an additional 70% and
25% for “H-5c” and “L-5c”, respectively. Third, contention
in DRAM bank buffers was observed when we compare the
results of “Same bank” in Figure 9 between high locality
and low locality victim programs —low locality victims al-
ready suffer from row-misses and the additional performance
degradation in high locality victims is due to bank buffer
contention (1.9× slowdown for H 5c verses 1.45× slowdown
for L 5c).
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Figure 9: Performance degradation due to memory channel
and bank contention. We use “H-xc” or “L-xc” to denote
the configuration that the victim program has high or low
locality, and both of the attacker and victim use x cores to
contend for the bus.
We consider the overall effect of memory flooding con-
tention. In this experiment, the victim VM runs a high
locality or low locality stream benchmark on its only vCPU.
The attacker VM allocates a memory buffer with the size
20× that of the LLC and runs a stream program which
keeps accessing memory blocks sequentially in this buffer to
generate contention in every channel and every bank. To in-
crease bus traffic, the attacker employed multiple vCPUs to
perform the attack simultaneously. The performance degra-
dation, as we can see in Figure 10, was significant when
the victim’s memory accesses footprint was mostly in the
DRAM, and more vCPUs of the attacker VM were used in
the attack. The attacker can use 8 vCPUs to induce about
1.5× slowdown to the victim with the buffer size larger than
LLC.
Takeaways. Contention can be induced in channel sched-
ulers, bank schedulers and bank buffers between different
programs from different processor packages. This contention
is especially significant when the victim program’s memory
footprint is larger than the LLC.
3.4.2 Practical Attack Evaluation
We evaluate two advanced memory flooding attacks.
Multi-threaded memory flooding. The attacker can
use more threads to increase the memory flooding speed, as
we demonstrated in the previous section. We evaluated this
attack on real-world applications. The attacker and victim
VMs are located in two different processor packages, so they
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Figure 10: Performance degradation due to memory flooding
contention. We use “H-x” or “L-x” to denote the victim
program has high or low memory locality and has a buffer
size of x.
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Figure 11: Performance overhead due to multi-threaded and
adaptive memory flooding attacks.
only share the IMCs and DRAM. The attacker VM issues
frequent, highly localized memory requests to flood every
DRAM bank and every channel. To increase bus traffic, the
attacker employed 8 vCPUs to perform the attack simulta-
neously. Figure 11 shows that the victim experiences up to
a 1.22× runtime slowdown when the attacker uses 8 vCPUs
to generate contention (Complete Memory Flooding bars).
Adaptive memory flooding. For a software program
with smaller memory footprint, only a few memory chan-
nels will be involved in its memory accesses. We developed a
novel approach with which an adversary may identify mem-
ory channels that are more frequently used by a victim pro-
gram. To achieve this, the attacker needs to reverse engineer
the unrevealed algorithms that map the physical memory
addresses to memory banks and channels, in order to accu-
rately direct the flows of the memory request flood.
Mapping DRAM banks and channels: The attacker can
leverage methods due to Liu et al. [29] to identify the bits
in physical memory addresses that index the DRAM banks.
The attacker first allocates a 1GB Hugepage with contin-
uous physical addresses, which avoids the unknown trans-
lations from guest virtual addresses to machine physical
addresses. Then he selects two memory blocks from the
Hugepage whose physical addresses differ in only one bit.
He then flushes these two blocks out of caches and accesses
them from the DRAM alternatively. A low latency indicates
these two memory blocks are served in two banks as there is
no contention on bank buffers. In this way, the attacker is
able to identify all the bank bits. Next, the attacker needs
to identify the channel bits among the bank bits. We design
a novel algorithm which is shown in Algorithm 2 to achieve
this goal. The attacker selects two groups of memory blocks
from the Hugepage, whose bank indexes differ in only one
bit. The attacker then allocates two threads to access the
two groups simultaneously. If the different bank index bit is
also a channel index bit, then the two groups will be in two
different channels, and a shorter access time will be observed
since there is no channel contention.
Algorithm 2: Discovering channel index bits
Input:
bank bit{} // bank index bits
memory buffer{} // a memory buffer
Output:
channel bit{}
begin
channel bit{}=∅
for each bit i ∈ bank bit{} do
buffer A{}=memory buffer{}
buffer B{}=memory buffer{}
for each memory block d a ∈ buffer A{} do
m a = physical address of d a
if (m a’s bit i) 6= 0 then
delete d a from buffer A{}
break
end
for each bit j ∈ bank bit{} and i 6= j do
if (m a’s bit j ) 6= 0 then
delete d a from buffer A{}
break
end
end
end
for each memory block d b ∈ buffer B{} do
m b = physical address of d b
if (m b’s bit i) 6= 1 then
delete d b from buffer B{}
break
end
for each bit j ∈ bank bit{} and i 6= j do
if (m b’s bit j ) 6= 0 then
delete d b from buffer B{}
break
end
end
end
thread A: // access buffer A in an infinite loop
while (true) do
for each memory block d a ∈ buffer A{} do
access d a (uncached)
end
end
thread B:// access buffer B N times and measure time
for i=0 to N-1 do
for each memory block d b ∈ buffer B{} do
access d b (uncached)
end
end
total time = thread B’s execution time;
if total time<Threshold then
add i to channel bit{}
end
end
return channel bit{}
end
Then the attacker performs two stages: in the Discover
Stage, the attacker keeps accessing each memory channel
for a number of times and measures his own memory ac-
cess time to infer contention from the victim program. By
identifying the channels with a longer access time, the at-
tacker can detect which channels are heavily used by the
victim. Note that the attacker only needs to discover the
Algorithm 3: Adaptive memory flooding
Input:
memory channel{}: all the channels in the memory
memory buffer{}
begin
/* Discover Stage */
victim channel=∅
for each channel i in memory channel{} do
access the addresses belonging to channel i from
memory buffer{}, and measure the total time (repeat
for a number of times)
if total time is high then
add i to victim channel{}
end
end
/* Attack Stage */
while attack is not finished do
for each channel i in victim channel{} do
access the addresses belonging to channel i from
memory buffer{}
end
end
end
channels used by the victim, but does not need to know the
exact value of channel index bits for a given channel. In
the Attack Stage, the attacker floods these selected mem-
ory channels. Algorithm 3 shows the two steps to conduct
adaptive memory flooding attacks.
Figure 11 shows the results when the attacker VM uses
8 vCPUs to generate contention in selected memory chan-
nels which are heavily used by the victim. These adap-
tive memory flooding attacks cause 3% ∼ 44% slowdown
while indiscriminately flooding the entire memory causes
only 0.07 ∼ 22% slowdown.
4. CASE STUDIES IN AMAZON EC2
We now evaluate our memory DoS attacks in a real cloud
environment, Amazon EC2. We provide two case studies:
memory DoS attacks against distributed applications, and
against E-Commerce websites.
Legal and ethical considerations. As our attacks only
involve memory accesses within the attacker VM’s own ad-
dress space, the experiments we conducted in this section
conformed with EC2 customer agreement. Nevertheless, we
put forth our best efforts in reducing the duration of the
attacks to minimally impact other users in the cloud.
VM configurations. We chose the same configuration for
the attacker and victim VMs: t2.medium instances with 2
vCPUs, 4GB memory and 8GB disk. Each VM ran Ubuntu
Server 14.04 LTS with Linux kernel version 3.13.0-48-generic,
in full virtualization mode. All VMs were launched in the
us-east-1c region. Information exposed through lscpu indi-
cated that these VMs were running on 2.5GHz Intel Xeon
E5-2670 processors, with a 32KB L1D and L1I cache, a
256KB L2 cache, and a shared 25MB LLC.
For all the experiments in this section, the attacker em-
ploys exotic atomic locking (Sec. 3.3) and LLC cleansing
attacks (Sec. 3.2), where each of the 2 attacker vCPUs was
used to keep locking the memory and cleansing the LLC.
Memory contention attacks (Section 3.4) are not used since
they cause much lower performance degradation (availabil-
ity loss) to the victim.
VM co-location in EC2. The memory DoS attacks re-
quire the attacker and victim VMs to co-locate on the same
machine. Past work [36, 39, 46] have proven the feasibil-
ity of such co-location attacks in public clouds. While cloud
providers adopt new technologies (e.g., Virtual Private Cloud
[3]) to mitigate prior attacks in [36], new ways are discov-
ered to test and detect co-location in [39, 46]. Specifically,
Varadarajan et al. [39] achieved co-location in Amazon EC2,
Google Compute Engine and Microsoft Azure with low-cost
(less than $8) in the order of minutes. They verified co-
location with various VM configurations, launch delay be-
tween attacker and victim, launch time of day, datacenter
location, etc.. Xu et al . [46] used similar ideas to achieve
co-location in EC2 Virtual Private Cloud. We also applied
these techniques to achieve co-location in Amazon EC2. In
our experiments, we simultaneously launched a large number
of attacker VMs in the same region as the victim VM. A ma-
chine outside EC2 under our control sent requests to static
web pages hosted in the target victim VM. Each time we se-
lect one attacker VM to conduct memory DoS attacks and
measure the victim VM’s response latency. Delayed HTTP
responses from the victim VM indicates that this attacker
was sharing the machine with the victim.
4.1 Attacking Distributed Applications
We evaluate memory DoS attacks on a multi-node dis-
tributed application deployed in a cluster of VMs, where
each VM is deployed as one node. We show how much per-
formance degradation an adversary can induce to the victim
cluster with minimal cost, using a single co-located attacker
VM.
Experiment settings. We used Hadoop as the victim
system. Hadoop consists of two layers: MapReduce for data
processing, and Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS)
for data storage. A Hadoop cluster includes a single master
node and multiple slave nodes. The master node acts as
both the Job Tracker for scheduling map or reduce jobs and
the NameNode for hosting HDFS indexes. Each slave node
acts as both the Task Tracker for conducting the map or re-
duce operations and the DataNode for storing data blocks in
HDFS. We deployed the Hadoop system with different num-
bers of VMs (5, 10, 15 or 20), where one VM was selected
as the master node and the rest were the slave nodes.
The attacker only used one VM to attack the cluster. He
either co-located the malicious VM with the master node or
one of the slave nodes. We ran four different Hadoop bench-
marks to test how much performance degradation the single
attacker VM can cause to the Hadoop cluster. Each experi-
ment was repeated 5 times. Figure 12 shows the mean values
of normalized execution time and one standard deviation.
MRBench: This benchmark tests the performance of the
MapReduce layer of the Hadoop system: it runs a small
MapReduce job of text processing for a number of times.
We set the number of mappers and reducers as the number
of slave nodes for each experiment. Figure 12a shows that
attacking a slave node is more effective since the slave node
is busy with the map and reduce tasks. In a large Hadoop
cluster with 20 nodes, attacking just one slave node intro-
duces 2.5× slowdown to the entire distributed system.
TestDFSIO: We use TestDFSIO to evaluate HDFS per-
formance. This benchmark writes and reads files stored in
HDFS. We configured it to operate on n files with the size of
500MB, where n is the number of slave nodes in the Hadoop
cluster. Figure 12b shows that attacking the slave node is
effective: the adversary can achieve about 2× slowdown.
NNBench: This program is also used to benchmark HDFS
in Hadoop. It generates HDFS-related management requests
on the master node of HDFS. We configured it to operate
on 200n small files, where n is the number of slave nodes in
the Hadoop cluster. Since the master node is heavily used
for serving the HDFS requests, attacking the master node
can introduce up to 3.4× slowdown to the whole Hadoop
system, as shown in Figure 12c.
Terasort: We use this benchmark to test the overall perfor-
mance of both MapReduce and HDFS layers in the Hadoop
cluster. TeraSort generates a large set of data and uses
map/reduce operations to sort the data. For each experi-
ment, we set the number of mappers and reducers to n, and
the size of data to be sorted to 100n MB, where n is the
number of slave nodes in the Hadoop cluster. Figure 12d
shows that attacking the slave node is very effective: it can
bring 2.8 ∼ 3.7 × slowdown to the entire Hadoop system.
Summary. The adversary can deny working memory avail-
ability to the victim VM and thus degrade an important
distributed system’s performance with minimal costs: it can
use just one VM to interfere with one of 20 nodes in the large
cluster. The slowdown of a single victim node can cause up
to 3.7× slowdown to the whole system.
4.2 Attacking E-Commerce Websites
A web application consists of load balancers, web servers,
database servers and memory caching servers. Memory DoS
attacks can disturb an E-commerce web application by at-
tacking various components.
Experiment settings. We chose a popular open source
E-commerce web application, Magento [7], as the target of
the attack. The victim application consists of five VMs:
a load balancer based on Pound for balancing network re-
quests; two Apache web servers to process and deliver web
requests; a MySQL database server to store customer and
merchandise information; and a Memcached server to speed
up database transactions. The five VMs were hosted on
different cloud servers in EC2. The adversary is able to
co-locate his VMs with one or multiple VMs that host the
victim application. We measure the application’s latency
and throughput to evaluate the effectiveness of the attack.
Latency. We launched a client on a local machine outside
of EC2. The client employed httperf [12] to send HTTP re-
quests to the load balancer with different rates (connections
per second) and we measured the average response time. We
evaluated the attack from one or all co-located VMs. Each
experiment was repeated 10 times and the mean and stan-
dard deviation of the latency are reported in Figure 13a.
This shows that memory contention on database, load bal-
ancer or memcached servers do not have much impact on
the overall performance of the web application, with only up
to 2× degradation. This is probably because these servers
were not heavily used in these cases. Memory DoS attacks
on web servers were the most effective (17× degradation).
When the adversary can co-locate with all victim servers
and each attacker VM induces contention with the victim,
the web server’s HTTP response time was delayed by 38×,
for a request rate of 50 connections per second.
Server throughput. Figure 13b shows the results of an-
other experiment, where we measured the throughput of
each victim VM individually, under memory DoS attacks.
We used ApacheBench [1] to evaluate the load balancer
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Figure 12: Performance slowdown of the Hadoop applications due to memory DoS attacks.
and web servers, SysBench [11] to evaluate the database
server and memtier benchmark [8] to evaluate the mem-
cached server. This shows memory DoS attacks on these
servers were effective: the throughput can be reduced to
only 13% ∼ 70% under malicious contention by the attacker.
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Figure 13: Latency and throughput of the Magento appli-
cation due to memory DoS attacks.
Summary. The adversary can compromise the quality of
E-commerce service and cause financial loss in two ways:
(1) long response latency will affect customers’ satisfaction
and make them leave this E-commerce website [35]; (2) it
can cause throughput degradation, reducing the number of
transactions completed in a unit time. The cost for these
attacks is relatively cheap: the adversary only needs a few
VMs to perform the attacks, with each t2.medium instance
costing $0.052 per hour.
5. DEFENSEAGAINSTMEMORYDOSAT-
TACKS
We propose a novel, general-purpose approach to detect-
ing and mitigating memory DoS attacks in the cloud. Unlike
some past work, our defense does not require prior profiling
of the memory resource usage of the applications. Our de-
fense can be provided by the cloud providers as a new secu-
rity service to customers. We denote as Protected VMs
those VMs for which the cloud customers require protection.
To detect memory DoS attacks, lightweight statistical tests
are performed frequently to monitor performance changes of
the Protected VMs (Sec. 5.1). To mitigate the attacks,
execution throttling is used to reduce the impact of the at-
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Figure 14: Probability distributions of the Protected
VM’s memory bandwidth.
tacks (Sec. 5.2). A novelty of our approach is the combined
use of two existing hardware features: event counting using
hardware performance counters controllable via the Perfor-
mance Monitoring Unit (PMU) and duty cycle modulation
controllable through the IA32_CLOCK_MODULATION Model Spe-
cific Register (MSR).
5.1 Detection Method
The key insight in detecting memory DoS attacks is that
such attacks are caused by abnormal resource contention be-
tween Protected VMs and attacker VMs, and such re-
source contention can significantly alter the memory usage
of the Protected VM, which can be observed by the cloud
provider. We postulate that the statistics of accesses to
memory resources, by a phase of a software program, fol-
low certain probability distributions. When a memory DoS
attack happens, these probability distributions will change.
Figure 14 shows the probability distributions of the Pro-
tected VM’s memory access statistics, without attacks
(black), and with two kinds of attacks (gray and shaded),
when it runs one of four applications introduced in Sec. 4.2,
i.e., the Apache web server, Mysql database, Memcached
and Pound load-balancer. When an attacker is present, the
probability distribution of the Protected VM’s memory
access statistics (in this case, memory bandwidth in Giga-
Bytes per second) changes significantly.
In practice, only samples drawn from the underlying prob-
ability distribution are observable. Therefore, the provider’s
task is to collect two sets of samples: [XR1 , X
R
2 , ..., X
R
nR ] are
reference samples collected from the probability distribution
when we are sure that there are no attacks; [XM1 , X
M
2 , ...,
XMnM ] are monitored samples collected from the Protected
VM at runtime, when attacks may occur. If these two sets
of samples are not drawn from the same distribution, we
can conclude that the performance of the Protected VM
is hindered by its neighboring VMs. When the distance be-
tween the two distributions is large, we may conclude the
Protected VM is under some memory DoS attacks.
We propose to use the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov
(KS) tests [30], as a metric for whether two samples belong
to the same probability distribution. The KS statistic is
defined in Equation 1, where Fn(x) is the empirical distri-
bution function of the samples [X1, X2, ..., Xn], and sup is
the supremum function (i.e., returning the maximum value).
Superscripts M and R denote the monitored samples and
reference samples, respectively. nM and nR are the number
of monitored samples and reference samples.
DnM, nR = sup
x
| FMnM(x)− FRnR(x) | (1)
DαnM, nR =
√
nM + nR
nM × nR
√
−0.5× ln(α
2
) (2)
Null hypothesis for KS test. We establish the null hy-
pothesis that currently monitored samples are drawn from
the same distribution as the reference samples. Benign per-
formance contention with non-attacking, co-tenant VMs will
not alter the probability distribution of the Protected
VM’s monitored samples significantly, so the KS statistic
is small and the null hypothesis is held. Equation 2 intro-
duces α: We can reject the null hypothesis with confidence
level 1−α if the KS statistic, DnM, nR , is greater than prede-
termined critical values DαnM, nR . Then, the cloud provider
can assume, with confidence level 1−α, that a memory DoS
attack exists, and trigger a mitigation strategy.
While monitored samples, XMi , are simply collected at
runtime, reference samples, XRi , ideally should be collected
when the Protected VM is not affected by other co-located
VMs. The technical challenge here is that if these samples
are collected offline, we need to assume the memory access
statistics of the VM never change during its life time, which
is unrealistic. If samples are collected at runtime, all the
co-locating VMs need to be paused during sample collec-
tion, which, if performed frequently, can cause significant
performance overhead to benign, co-located VMs.
Pseudo Isolated Reference Sampling. To address this
technical challenge, we use execution throttling to collect the
reference samples at runtime. The basic idea is to throt-
tle down the execution speed of other VMs, but maintain
the Protected VM’s speed during the reference sampling
stage. This can reduce the co-located VMs’ interference
without pausing them.
Execution throttling is based on a feature provided in In-
tel Processors called duty cycle modulation [6], which is de-
signed to regulate each core’s execution speed and power
consumption. The processor allows software to assign “duty
cycles” to each CPU core: the core will be active during
these duty cycles, and inactive during the non-duty cycles.
For example, the duty cycle of a core can be set from 16/16
(no throttling), 15/16, 14/16, ..., down to 1/16 (maximum
throttling). Each core uses a model specific register (MSR),
IA32_CLOCK_MODULATION, to control the duty cycle ratio: bit
4 of this MSR denotes if the duty cycle modulation is en-
abled for this core; bits 0-3 represent the number of 1/16 of
the total CPU cycles set as duty cycles.
In execution throttling, the execution speed of other VMs
will be throttled down and very little contention is induced
to the Protected VM. As such, reference samples collected
during the execution throttling stage are drawn from a quasi
contention-free distribution.
Figure 15a illustrates the high-level strategy for monitor-
ing Protected VMs. The reference samples are collected
during the reference sampling periods (WR), where other
VMs’ execution speeds are throttled down. The monitored
samples are collected during the monitored sampling peri-
ods (WM ), where co-located VMs run normally, without ex-
ecution throttling. KS tests are performed right after each
monitored sample is collected, and probability distribution
divergence is estimated by comparing with the most recent
reference samples. Monitored samples are collected peri-
odically at a time interval of LM , and reference samples
are collected periodically at a time interval of LR. We can
also randomize the intervals LM and LR for each period to
prevent the attacker from reverse-engineering the detection
scheme and scheduling the attack phases to avoid detection.
If the KS test results reject the null hypothesis, it may
be because the Protected VM is in a different execution
phase with different memory access statistics, or it may be
due to memory DoS attacks. To rule out the first possi-
bility, double checking automatically occurs since reference
samples are re-collected and updated after a time interval of
LR. If deviation of the probability distribution still exists,
attacks can be confirmed.
5.2 Mitigation Method
The cloud provider has several methods to mitigate the
attack. One is VM migration, which can be achieved either
by reassigning the vCPUs of a VM to a different CPU pack-
age, when the memory resource being contended is in the
same package (e.g., LLC), or by migrating the entire VM
to another server, when the memory resource contended is
shared system-wide (e.g., memory bus). However, such VM
migration can not completely eliminate the attacker VM’s
impact on other VMs.
An alternative approach is to identify the attacker VM,
and then employ execution throttling to reduce the execu-
tion speed of the malicious VM, while meanwhile the cloud
provider conducts further investigation and/or notifies the
customer of the suspected attacker VM of observed resource
abuse activities.
Identifying the attacker VM. Once memory DoS at-
tacks are detected, to mitigate the threat, the cloud provider
needs to identify which of the co-located VMs is conduct-
ing the attack. Here we propose a novel approach to identify
malicious VMs based on selective execution throttling in a bi-
nary search manner : First, half of the co-located VMs keep
normal execution speed while the rest of VMs are throt-
tled down during reference sampling periods (Figure 15b,
2nd Reference Sampling period). If in this case, reference
samples and monitored samples are drawn from the same
distribution, then there are malicious VMs among the ones
not throttled down during the reference sampling period.
Then, we select half of the remaining VMs to be throttled
while all the other VMs are in normal speed, to collect the
next reference samples. In Figure 15b, this is the 3rd Refer-
ence Sampling period, where only VM3 is throttled. Since
PROTECTED VM
Co-located VM1
Co-located VM2
Co-located VM3
WR
LR
WM
LM
Execution Throttling Reference sampling Monitored sampling
Co-located VM4
(a) Monitoring the Protected VM.
PROTECTED VM
Co-located VM1
Co-located VM2
Co-located VM4
Execution Throttling Reference sampling Monitored sampling
Attack VM
(b) Identifying co-located VM3 as the attacker VM.
Figure 15: Illustration of monitoring the Protected VM (a) and identifying the attack VM (b). The blue “4” means the
null hypothesis is accepted; while the red “8” means the null hypothesis is rejected.
the subsequent monitored samples have a different distribu-
tion compared to this Reference Sample, VM3 is identified
as the attack VM. Note that if there are multiple attacker
VMs on the server, we can use the above procedure to find
one VM each time and repeat it until all the attacker VMs
are found. By organizing this search for the attacker VM
or VMs as a binary search, the time taken to identify the
source of memory contention is O (log n), where n is the
number of co-tenant VMs on the Protected VM’s server.
Algorithm 4 shows how to detect attacker VMs using this
selective execution throttling.
Algorithm 4: Identifying and mitigating the attacker
VMs that cause severe resource contention.
Input:
VM[1,...,n] /* set of co-tenant VMs */
function IdentifyAttacker(sub VM)
/* sub VM: set of VMs to identify */
if sub VM.length() = 1 then
return sub VM[0]
else
imin = 0
imax = sub VM.length()-1
imid = d(imin+imax)/2e
ThrottleDown(sub VM[0,...,imid-1])
reference sample = DataCollect()
ThrottleUp(sub VM[0,...,imid-1])
monitor sample = DataCollect()
result = KSTest(reference sample, monitor sample)
if result = Reject then
return IdentifyAttacker(sub VM[0,...,imid-1])
else
return IdentifyAttacker(sub VM[imid,...,imax])
end
end
end
begin
vm = IdentifyAttacker(VM)
ThrottleDown([vm])
end
5.3 Implementation
We implement a prototype system of our proposed defense
on the OpenStack platform. Figure 16 shows the defense
architecture overview. We adopt the CloudMonatt architec-
ture from [48]. Specifically, the system includes three types
of servers. The Cloud Controller is the cloud manager that
manages the VMs. It has a Policy Validation Module to
receive and analyze customers’ requests. It also has a Re-
sponse Module, which can throttle down the attacker VMs’
execution speed to mitigate memory DoS attacks. The At-
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Figure 16: Architecture overview.
testation Server is a centralized server for monitoring and
detection of memory DoS attacks. It has a Verification
Module that receives Protected VM’s performance prob-
ability distribution, detects memory DoS attacks and iden-
tifies malicious VMs.
On each of the cloud servers, we use the KVM hypervisor
which is the default setup for OpenStack. Other virtual-
ization platforms, such as Xen and HyperV, can also be
used. Two software modules are installed on the host OS.
A Detector measures the memory access characteristics of
the Protected VM using Performance Monitoring Units
(PMU), which are commonly available in most modern pro-
cessors. A PMU provides a set of Hardware Performance
Counters to count hardware-related events. In our imple-
mentation, we use the linux kernel API perf_event to mea-
sure the memory access statistics for the number of LLC
accesses per sampling period. A Regulator is in charge of
controlling VMs’ execution speed. It uses the wrmsr instruc-
tion to modify the IA32_CLOCK_MODULATION MSR to control
the duty cycle ratio.
In our implementation, the parameters involved in refer-
ence and monitored sampling are as follows: WR = WM =
1s, LM = 2s, LR = 30s. These values were selected to strike
a balance between the performance overhead due to execu-
tion throttling and detection accuracy. In each sampling
period, n = 100 samples are collected, with each collected
during a period of 10ms. We choose 10ms because it is short
enough to provide accurate measurements, and long enough
to return stable results. In the KS tests, the confidence level,
1 − α, is set as 0.999, and the threshold to reject the null
hypothesis is Dα = 0.276 (given α = 0.001). If 4 consecutive
KS statistics larger than 0.276 are observed (the choice of 4
is elaborated in Sec. 5.4), it is assured that the Protected
VM’s memory access statistics have been changed. Then to
confirm that such changes are due to memory DoS attacks,
reference samples will be refreshed and the malicious VM
will be identified.
5.4 Evaluation
Our lab testbed comprised three servers. A Dell R210II
Server (equipped with one quad-core, 3.30GHz, Intel Xeon
E3-1230v2 processor with 8MB LLC) was configured as the
Cloud Controller as well as the Attestation Server. Two Dell
PowerEdge R720 Servers (one has two six-core, 2.90GHz
Intel Xeon E5-2667 processors with 15MB LLC, the other
has one eight-core, 2.90GHz Intel Xeon E5-2690 processor
with 20MB LLC) were deployed to function as VM hosting
servers.
Detection accuracy. We deployed a Protected VM
sharing a cloud server with 8 other VMs. Among these
8 VMs, one VM was an attacker VM conducting a multi-
threaded LLC cleansing attack with 4 threads (Sec. 3.2), or
an atomic locking attack (Sec. 3.3). The remaining 7 VMs
were benign VMs running common linux utilities. The Pro-
tected VM runs one of the web, database, memcached
or load-balancer applications in the Magento application
(Sec. 4.2). The experiments consisted of four stages; the
KS statistics of each of the four workloads during the four
stages under the two types of attacks are shown in Figure 17.
In stage I, the Protected VM runs while the attacker is
idle. The KS statistic in this stage is relatively low. So we
accept the null hypothesis that the memory accesses of the
reference and monitored samples follow the same probabil-
ity distribution. In stage II, the attacker VM conducts the
LLC cleansing or atomic locking attacks. We observe the
KS statistic is much higher than 0.276. The null hypothe-
sis is rejected, signaling detection of potential memory DoS
attacks. In stage III, the cloud provider runs three rounds
of reference resampling to pinpoint the malicious VM. Re-
source contention mitigation is performed in stage IV: the
cloud provider throttles down the attacker VM’s execution
speed. After this stage, the KS statistic falls back to normal
which suggests that the attacks are mitigated.
We also evaluated the false positive rates and false nega-
tive rates of two different criteria for identifying a memory
access anomaly: 1 abnormal KS statistic (larger than the
critical value Dα) or 4 consecutive abnormal KS statistics.
Figure 18a shows the true positive rate of LLC cleansing
and atomic locking attack detection, at different confidence
levels 1−α. We observe that the true positive rate is always
one (thus zero false negatives), regardless of the detection
criteria (1 vs 4 abnormal KS tests). Figure 18b shows the
false positive rate, which can be caused by background noise
due to other VMs’ executions. This figure shows that using
4 consecutive abnormal KS statistics significantly reduces
the false positive rate.
Effectiveness of mitigation. We evaluated the effective-
ness of execution throttling based mitigation. The Pro-
tected VM runs the cloud benchmarks from the Magento
application while the attacker VM runs LLC cleansing or
atomic locking attacks. We chose different duty cycle ratios
for the attacker VM. Figures 19a and 19b show the nor-
malized performance of the Protected VM with different
throttling ratios, under LLC cleansing and atomic locking
attacks, respectively. The x-axis shows the duty cycle (x ×
1/16) given to the co-located VMs, going from no throttling
on the left to maximum throttling on the right of each figure.
The y-axis shows the Protected VM’s response latency
(for web and load-balancer) or throughput (for memcached
and database) normalized to the ones without attack. A
high latency or a small throughput indicates that the per-
formance of the Protected VM is highly taffected by the
attacker VM. We can see that a smaller throttling ratio can
effectively reduce the attacker’s impact on the victim’s per-
formance. When the ratio is set as 1/16, the victim’s per-
formance degradation caused by the attacker is kept within
12% (compared to 23% ∼ 50% degradation with no throt-
tling) for LLC cleansing attacks. It is within 14% for atomic
locking attacks (compared to 7× degradation with no throt-
tling).
Latency increase and mitigation. We chose a latency-
critical application, the Magento E-commerce application as
the target victim. One Apache web server was selected as
the Protected VM, co-locating with an attacker and 7
benign VMs running linux utilities. Figure 20 shows the re-
sponse latency with and without our defense. The detection
phase does not affect the Protected VM’s performance
(stage I), since the PMU collects monitored samples with-
out interrupting the VM’s execution. In stage II, the attack
occurs and the defense system detects the Protected VM’s
performance is degraded. In stage III, attacker VM identi-
fication is done. After throttling down the attacker VM in
stage IV, the Protected VM’s performance is not affected
by the memory DoS attacks. The latency during the attack
in Phase II increases significantly, but returns to normal af-
ter mitigation in Phase IV.
We also evaluated the performance overhead of co-located
VMs due to execution throttling in the detection step. We
launched one VM running one of the eight SPEC2006 or
PARSEC benchmarks. Then we periodically throttle down
this VM every 10s, 20s or 30s. Each time throttling lasted
for 1s (the same value for WR and WM used earlier). The
normalized performance of this VM is shown in Figure 21.
We can see that when the server throttles this VM every
10s, the performance penalty can be around 10%. However,
when the frequency is set to be 30s (our implementation
choice), this penalty is smaller than 5%.
6. RELATEDWORK
6.1 Resource Contention Attacks
Cloud DoS attacks. [28] proposed a DoS attack which can
deplete the victim’s network bandwidth from its subnet. [15]
proposed a network-initiated DoS attack which causes con-
tention in the shared Network Interface Controller. [23] pro-
posed cascading performance attacks which exhaust hyper-
visor’s I/O processing capability. [14] exploited VM migra-
tion to degrade the hypervisor’s performance. Our work is
different as we exploit failure of isolation in the hardware
memory subsystem (which has not been addressed by cloud
providers), and not attacks on networks or hypervisors.
Cloud resource stealing attacks. [38] proposed the resource-
freeing attack, where a malicious VM can steal one type of
resource from the co-located victim VM by increasing this
VM’s usage of other types of resources. [54] designed a CPU
resource attack where an attacker VM can exploit the boost
mechanism in the Xen credit scheduler to obtain more CPU
resource than paid for. Our attacks do not steal extra cloud
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Figure 17: KS statistics of the Protected VM for detecting and mitigating memory DoS attacks.
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Figure 18: Detection accuracy.
resources. Rather, we aim to induce the maximum perfor-
mance degradation to the co-located victim VM targets.
Hardware resource contention studies. [21] studied the
effect of trace cache evictions on the victim’s execution with
Hyper-Threading enabled in an Intel Pentium 4 Xeon pro-
cessor. [43] explored frequently flushing shared L2 caches on
multicore platforms to slow down a victim program. They
studied saturation and locking of buses that connect L1/L2
caches and the main memory [43]. [32] studied contention
attacks on the schedulers of memory controllers. However,
due to advances in computer hardware design, caches and
DRAMs are larger and their management policies more so-
phisticated, so these prior attacks may not work in modern
cloud settings.
Timing channels in clouds. Prior studies showed that
shared memory resources can be exploited by an attacker to
extract crypto keys from the victim VM using cache side-
channel attacks in cloud settings [27, 51, 52], or to trans-
mit information, using cache operations [36, 45] or bus ac-
tivities [44] in covert channel communications between two
VMs. Unlike side-channel attacks our memory DoS attacks
aim to maximize the effects of resource contention, while re-
source contention is an unintended side-effect of side-channel
attacks. To maximize contention, we addressed various new
challenges, e.g., finding which attacks cause greatest resource
contention (exotic bus locking versus memory controller at-
tacks), maximizing the frequency of resource depletion, and
minimizing self-contention. To the best of our knowledge,
we are the first to show that similar attack strategies (en-
hanced for resource contention) can be used as availability
attacks as well as confidentiality attacks.
6.2 Eliminating Resource Contention
VM performance monitoring. Public clouds offer per-
formance monitoring services for customers’ VMs and ap-
plications, e.g., Amazon CloudWatch [2], Microsoft Azure
Application Insights [9], Google Stackdriver [4], etc.. How-
ever, these services only monitor CPU usage, network traffic
and disk bandwidth, but not low-level memory usage. To
measure a VM’s performance without contention for refer-
ence sampling, past work offer three ways: (1) collecting
the VM’s performance characteristics before it is deployed
in the cloud [19,53]; (2) measuring the performance of other
VMs which run similar tasks [34,50]; (3) measuring the Pro-
tected VM while pausing all other co-located VMs [22,47].
The drawback of (1) and (2) is that it only works for pro-
grams with predictable and stable performance character-
istics, and does not support arbitrary programs running in
the Protected VM. The problem with (3) is the signifi-
cant performance overhead inflicted on co-located VMs. In
contrast, we use novel execution throttling of the co-located
VMs to collect the Protected VM’s baseline (reference)
measurements with negligible performance overhead. While
execution throttling has been used to achieve resource fair-
ness in prior work [20,49]; using it to collect Reference sam-
ples at runtime is, to our knowledge, novel.
QoS-aware VM scheduling. Prior research propose to
predict interference between different applications (or VMs)
by profiling their resource usage offline and then statically
scheduling them to different servers if co-locating them will
lead to excessive resource contention [19, 47, 53]. The un-
derlying assumption is that applications (or VMs), when
deployed on the cloud servers, will not change their resource
usage patterns. Unfortunately, these approaches fall short in
defense against malicious applications, who can reduce their
resource uses during the profiling stage, then run memory
DoS attacks when deployed, thus evading these QoS schedul-
ing mechanisms.
Load-triggered VM migration. Some studies propose
to monitor the resource consumption of guest VMs or the
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Figure 19: Normalized performance of the Protected VM with throttling of memory DoS attacks.
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Figure 20: Request latency of Magento Application
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Figure 21: Performance overhead of co-located VMs due to
monitoring.
entire server in real-time, and migrate VMs to different pro-
cessor packages or servers when there is severe resource con-
tention [13, 17, 40, 55]. By doing so these approaches can
dynamically balance the workload among multiple packages
or servers when some of them are overloaded, and achieve an
optimal resource allocation. While they work well for per-
formance optimization of a set of fully-loaded servers, they
fail to detect carefully-crafted memory DoS attacks. First,
the metrics in their methods cannot be used to detect the
existence of memory DoS attacks. These works measure the
LLC miss rate [17,55] or memory bandwidth [13,40] of guest
VMs or the whole server. A high LLC miss rate or memory
bandwidth indicates severe resource contention for the VMs
or servers. However, a memory DoS attack does not need to
cause high LLC miss rate or memory bandwidth in order to
degrade a victim’s performance. For instance, atomic lock-
ing attacks lock the bus temporarily but frequently, which
could incur decreased LLC accesses and LLC misses in the
victim VM. Our experiments show the victim VM’s LLC
miss rate does not change, and its memory bandwidth is even
decreased. So such micro-architectural measurement can
never reveal severe resource contention, or trigger VM mi-
gration in the above approaches. Second, these approaches
aim to balance the system’s performance. So they cannot
guarantee to choose the victim or attacker VMs for migra-
tion when they achieve optimal workload placement. For
instance, Adaptive LLC cleaning attacks can increase vic-
tim VMs’ LLC miss rate. However, the above approaches
have no means to figure out that the victim VM has the
strongest desire for migration. It is possible that there ex-
ists another VM, which has even higher LLC miss rate than
the victim VM, due to its internal execution behaviors, not
the interaction and contention with the attacker. So the
above approaches will migrate this VM instead of the vic-
tim VM, as this VM has the highest miss rate. Then the
victim VM will still suffer LLC cleaning attacks.
Performance isolation. While cloud providers can of-
fer single-tenant machines to customers with high demand
for security and performance, disallowing resource sharing
by VMs will lead to low resource utilization and thus is at
odds with the cloud business model. Another option is to
partition memory resources to enforce performance isola-
tion on shared resources (e.g., LLC [5, 18, 25, 26, 37, 42], or
DRAM [32,33,41]). These works aim to achieve fairness be-
tween different domains and provide fair QoS. However, they
cannot effectively defeat memory DoS attacks. For cache
partitioning, software page coloring methods [26] can cause
significant wastage of LLC space, while hardware cache par-
titioning mechanisms have insufficient partitions (e.g., Intel
Cache Allocation Technology [5] only provides four QoS par-
titions on the LLC). Furthermore, LLC cache partitioning
methods cannot resolve atomic locking attacks.
To summarize, existing solutions fail to address memory
DoS attacks because they assume benign applications with
non-malicious behaviors. Also, they are often tailored to
only one type of attack so that they cannot be generalized
to all memory DoS attacks, unlike our proposed defense.
7. CONCLUSIONS
We presented memory DoS attacks, in which a malicious
VM intentionally induces memory resource contention to
degrade the performance of co-located victim VMs. We
proposed several advanced techniques to conduct such at-
tacks, and demonstrate the severity of the resulting perfor-
mance degradation. Our attacks work on modern memory
systems in cloud servers, for which prior attacks on older
memory systems are often ineffective. We evaluated our at-
tacks against two commonly used applications in a public
cloud, Amazon EC2, and show that the adversary can cause
significant performance degradation to not only co-located
VMs, but to the entire distributed application.
We then designed a novel and generalizable method that
can detect and mitigate all known memory DoS attacks.
Our approach collects the Protected VM’s reference and
monitored behaviors at runtime using the Performance Mon-
itor Unit. This is done by establishing a pseudo isolated
collection environment by using the duty-cycle modulation
feature to throttle the co-resident VMs for collecting Refer-
ence samples. Statistical tests are performed to detect differ-
ing performance probability distributions between Reference
and Monitored samples, with desired confidence levels. Our
evaluation shows this defense can detect and defeat memory
DoS attacks with very low performance overhead.
8. REFERENCES
[1] Ab - the apache software foundation. http:
//httpd.apache.org/docs/2.2/programs/ab.html.
[2] Amazon CloudWatch.
https://aws.amazon.com/cloudwatch/.
[3] Amazon virtual private cloud.
https://aws.amazon.com/vpc/.
[4] Google Stackdriver.
https://cloud.google.com/stackdriver/.
[5] Improving real-time performance by utilizing cache
allocation technology. http://www.intel.com/
content/www/us/en/communications/cache-
allocation-technology-white-paper.html.
[6] Intel 64 and ia-32 architectures software developer’s
manual, volume 3: System programming guide. http:
//www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/processors/
architectures-software-developer-manuals.html.
[7] Magento: ecommerce software and ecommerce
platform. http://www.magento.com/.
[8] memtier benchmark.
https://github.com/RedisLabs/memtier_benchmark.
[9] Microsoft Azure Application Insights.
https://azure.microsoft.com/en-
us/services/application-insights/.
[10] Spec cpu 2006. https://www.spec.org/cpu2006/.
[11] Sysbench: a system performance benchmark.
https://launchpad.net/sysbench/.
[12] Welcome to the httperf homepage.
http://www.hpl.hp.com/research/linux/httperf/.
[13] J. Ahn, C. Kim, J. Han, Y.-R. Choi, and J. Huh.
Dynamic virtual machine scheduling in clouds for
architectural shared resources. In USENIX Conference
on Hot Topics in Cloud Computing, 2012.
[14] S. Alarifi and S. D. Wolthusen. Robust coordination of
cloud-internal denial of service attacks. In Intl. Conf.
on Cloud and Green Computing, 2013.
[15] H. S. Bedi and S. Shiva. Securing cloud infrastructure
against co-resident DoS attacks using game theoretic
defense mechanisms. In Intl. Conf. on Advances in
Computing, Communications and Informatics, 2012.
[16] C. Bienia. Benchmarking Modern Multiprocessors.
PhD thesis, Princeton University, 2011.
[17] S. Blagodurov, S. Zhuravlev, A. Fedorova, and
A. Kamali. A case for numa-aware contention
management on multicore systems. In ACM Intl. Conf.
on Parallel architectures and compilation techniques.
[18] H. Cook, M. Moreto, S. Bird, K. Dao, D. A.
Patterson, and K. Asanovic. A hardware evaluation of
cache partitioning to improve utilization and
energy-efficiency while preserving responsiveness. In
Intl. Symp. on Computer Architecture, 2013.
[19] C. Delimitrou and C. Kozyrakis. Paragon: Qos-aware
scheduling for heterogeneous datacenters. In Intl.
Conf. on Architectural Support for Programming
Languages and Operating Systems, 2013.
[20] E. Ebrahimi, C. J. Lee, O. Mutlu, and Y. N. Patt.
Fairness via source throttling: A configurable and
high-performance fairness substrate for multi-core
memory systems. In Architectural Support for
Programming Languages and Operating Systems, 2010.
[21] D. Grunwald and S. Ghiasi. Microarchitectural denial
of service: Insuring microarchitectural fairness. In
ACM/IEEE Intl. Symp. on Microarchitecture, 2002.
[22] A. Gupta, J. Sampson, and M. B. Taylor. Quality
time: A simple online technique for quantifying
multicore execution efficiency. In IEEE Intl. Symp. on
Performance Analysis of Systems and Software, 2014.
[23] Q. Huang and P. P. Lee. An experimental study of
cascading performance interference in a virtualized
environment. SIGMETRICS Perform. Eval. Rev.,
2013.
[24] P. Jamkhedkar, J. Szefer, D. Perez-Botero, T. Zhang,
G. Triolo, and R. B. Lee. A framework for realizing
security on demand in cloud computing. In Conf. on
Cloud Computing Technology and Science, 2013.
[25] D. Kim, H. Kim, and J. Huh. vcache: Providing a
transparent view of the llc in virtualized
environments. Computer Architecture Letters, 2014.
[26] T. Kim, M. Peinado, and G. Mainar-Ruiz.
Stealthmem: System-level protection against
cache-based side channel attacks in the cloud. In
USENIX Security Symp., 2012.
[27] F. Liu, Y. Yarom, Q. Ge, G. Heiser, and R. B. Lee.
Last-level cache side-channel attacks are practical. In
IEEE Symp. on Security and Privacy, 2015.
[28] H. Liu. A new form of DoS attack in a cloud and its
avoidance mechanism. In ACM Workshop on Cloud
Computing Security, 2010.
[29] L. Liu, Z. Cui, M. Xing, Y. Bao, M. Chen, and C. Wu.
A software memory partition approach for eliminating
bank-level interference in multicore systems. In Intl.
Conf. on Parallel Architectures and Compilation
Techniques, 2012.
[30] F. J. Massey Jr. The kolmogorov-smirnov test for
goodness of fit. Journal of the American statistical
Association, 1951.
[31] J. D. McCalpin. Stream: Sustainable memory
bandwidth in high performance computers.
http://www.cs.virginia.edu/stream/.
[32] T. Moscibroda and O. Mutlu. Memory performance
attacks: Denial of memory service in multi-core
systems. In USENIX Security Symp., 2007.
[33] S. P. Muralidhara, L. Subramanian, O. Mutlu,
M. Kandemir, and T. Moscibroda. Reducing memory
interference in multicore systems via application-aware
memory channel partitioning. In ACM/IEEE Intl.
Symp. on Microarchitecture, 2011.
[34] D. Novakovic´, N. Vasic´, S. Novakovic´, D. Kostic´, and
R. Bianchini. Deepdive: Transparently identifying and
managing performance interference in virtualized
environments. In USENIX Conf. on Annual Technical
Conference, 2013.
[35] N. Poggi, D. Carrera, R. Gavalda, and E. Ayguade.
Non-intrusive estimation of qos degradation impact on
e-commerce user satisfaction. In IEEE Intl. Symp. on
Network Computing and Applications, 2011.
[36] T. Ristenpart, E. Tromer, H. Shacham, and S. Savage.
Hey, you, get off of my cloud: Exploring information
leakage in third-party compute clouds. In ACM Conf.
on Computer and Communications Security, 2009.
[37] D. Sanchez and C. Kozyrakis. Vantage: Scalable and
efficient fine-grain cache partitioning. In AMC Intl.
Symp. on Computer Architecture, 2011.
[38] V. Varadarajan, T. Kooburat, B. Farley,
T. Ristenpart, and M. M. Swift. Resource-freeing
attacks: Improve your cloud performance (at your
neighbor’s expense). In ACM Conf. on Computer and
Communications Security, 2012.
[39] V. Varadarajan, Y. Zhang, T. Ristenpart, and
M. Swift. A placement vulnerability study in
multi-tenant public clouds. In USENIX Security
Symp., 2015.
[40] H. Wang, C. Isci, L. Subramanian, J. Choi, D. Qian,
and O. Mutlu. A-drm: Architecture-aware distributed
resource management of virtualized clusters. In ACM
Intl. Conference on Virtual Execution Environments,
2015.
[41] Y. Wang, A. Ferraiuolo, and G. E. Suh. Timing
channel protection for a shared memory controller. In
IEEE Intl. Symp. on High Performance Computer
Architecture, 2014.
[42] Z. Wang and R. B. Lee. New cache designs for
thwarting software cache-based side channel attacks.
In ACM Intl. Symp. on Computer Architecture, 2007.
[43] D. H. Woo and H.-H. S. Lee. Analyzing performance
vulnerability due to resource denial-of-service attack
on chip multiprocessors. In Workshop on Chip
Multiprocessor Memory Systems and Interconnects,
2007.
[44] Z. Wu, Z. Xu, and H. Wang. Whispers in the
hyper-space: High-speed covert channel attacks in the
cloud. In USENIX Security Symp., 2012.
[45] Y. Xu, M. Bailey, F. Jahanian, K. Joshi, M. Hiltunen,
and R. Schlichting. An exploration of L2 cache covert
channels in virtualized environments. In ACM
Workshop on Cloud computing security, 2011.
[46] Z. Xu, H. Wang, and Z. Wu. A measurement study on
co-residence threat inside the cloud. In USENIX
Security Symp., 2015.
[47] H. Yang, A. Breslow, J. Mars, and L. Tang.
Bubble-flux: Precise online qos management for
increased utilization in warehouse scale computers. In
ACM Intl. Symp. on Computer Architecture, 2013.
[48] T. Zhang and R. B. Lee. Cloudmonatt: An
architecture for security health monitoring and
attestation of virtual machines in cloud computing. In
ACM Intl. Symp. on Computer Architecture, 2015.
[49] X. Zhang, S. Dwarkadas, and K. Shen. Hardware
execution throttling for multi-core resource
management. In USENIX Annual Technical
Conference, 2009.
[50] X. Zhang, E. Tune, R. Hagmann, R. Jnagal,
V. Gokhale, and J. Wilkes. Cpi2: Cpu performance
isolation for shared compute clusters. In ACM
European Conf. on Computer Systems, 2013.
[51] Y. Zhang, A. Juels, M. K. Reiter, and T. Ristenpart.
Cross-VM side channels and their use to extract
private keys. In ACM Conf. on Computer and
Communications Security, 2012.
[52] Y. Zhang, A. Juels, M. K. Reiter, and T. Ristenpart.
Cross-tenant side-channel attacks in PaaS clouds. In
ACM Conf. on Computer and Communications
Security, 2014.
[53] Y. Zhang, M. A. Laurenzano, J. Mars, and L. Tang.
Smite: Precise qos prediction on real-system smt
processors to improve utilization in warehouse scale
computers. In IEEE/ACM Intl. Symp. on
Microarchitecture, 2014.
[54] F. Zhou, M. Goel, P. Desnoyers, and R. Sundaram.
Scheduler vulnerabilities and coordinated attacks in
cloud computing. In IEEE Intl. Symp. on Network
Computing and Applications, 2011.
[55] S. Zhuravlev, S. Blagodurov, and A. Fedorova.
Addressing shared resource contention in multicore
processors via scheduling. In Intl. Conf. on
Architectural Support for Programming Languages and
Operating Systems, 2010.
